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This paper investigates the impact of borrowing constraints on welfare in a standard overlapping-
generations model where parental altruism results in transfers. I ￿nd that the average level of
welfare is higher when children cannot borrow against future income. As Bernheim (1989)
showed, the Nash-Cournot equilibrium does not maximize the average level of utility of cur-
rently living agents; the presence of a borrowing constraint increases children￿ s savings and
parental transfers bringing their levels closer to the optimum, raising children￿ s welfare as well
as average welfare in the short-run and in the long-run.
Additionally, borrowing constraints reduce investment on children￿ s education, decreasing
the aggregate level of human capital, but raises aggregate savings and, hence, physical capital.
When prices are ￿ exible, the latter e⁄ect dominates and the positive welfare impact of the credit
constraint is higher.
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In this paper, I show that in a standard overlapping generations economy where parents care about
the lifetime utility of their children, a borrowing constraint that does not allow children to borrow
against future income can be welfare improving both in the long-run and in the short-run.
Credit constraints have been a long time concern of policy makers and economic analysts as
they are viewed as a critical obstacle to an e¢ cient allocation of resources. In recent years, the
impact of borrowing constraints on human capital accumulation has drawn greater attention in
the literature. Typically, children cannot borrow against their future income to ￿nance education,
and it is argued that this borrowing constraint prevents children from acquiring optimal levels of
consumption and education and makes them worse o⁄. The overall presumption is that the average
levels of welfare are lower in the constrained equilibrium than in an unconstrained one.
Additionally, the current debate on the impact of credit constraints has also focused on the
relationship between credit constraints and child labor. A growing theoretical literature points to
the lack of access to credit as the principal factor behind ine¢ ciently high levels of child labor
(e.g., Baland and Robinson, 2000 and Ranjan, 2001), and empirical evidence has found a strong
relation between the existence of borrowing constraints and child labor (e.g., Beegle, Dehejia and
Gatti, 2003 and Edmonds, 2004). Besides impeding the access of children to resources that they
can allocate to education, credit constraints also reduce the time available to education by requiring
children to supply ine¢ ciently high levels of labor to ￿nance consumption and the accumulation of
human capital.
These alleged harmful impacts of credit constraints have generated support for governments to
intervene by developing credit markets or implementing public policies that mitigate the impacts.
However, a more straightforward implication of the presumptions on borrowing constraints is that
we should set up policies that replicate, in a constrained economy, the allocation of resources
that would be obtained with complete markets. For example, Becker and Murphy (1988) argue
that welfare policies should replicate social arrangements within the extended family or small
communities that in the past implemented the allocation of resources that would be obtained
in the presence of complete markets. In the same line, Rangel (2003) and Boldrin and Montes
(2005) show that public funding of education and social security policies can be set up to mimic
1the unconstrained equilibrium. The support for government policies that help deliver allocations
closer to the unconstrained equilibrium is predicated on the idea that under liquidity constraints
competitive equilibria are ine¢ cient and are ￿worse￿than the unconstrained equilibria.
A clearer understanding of the e⁄ect of borrowing constraints is critical to evaluate the impact
that suggested policies might have on the well-being of agents, as the implementation of policies
based on incorrect assumptions can make agents signi￿cantly worse o⁄. But, although credit
constraints are central to an individual￿ s optimal allocation of resources across time, there has not
been a signi￿cant amount of formal economic analysis to assess their welfare implications.
I revisit the discussion of the impact of credit constraints on welfare and human capital accu-
mulation in a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with parental altruism. I assume
that children are economic agents with the same preferences as adults, allocating resources to the
acquisition of human capital and enjoying consumption and leisure. Furthermore, I assume that
parents care about their children￿ s well-being in the sense that children￿ s lifetime utility enters their
parents￿utility function, and as rational and forward-looking agents, they take into account the
full impact of their decisions on their children￿ s future income levels.
Surprisingly, both current and future children are made better o⁄ by the introduction of a
borrowing constraint in a environment where children borrow against future income to ￿nance
their consumption and education. Furthermore, allowing for the borrowing constraint is welfare
improving in the sense that it increases the average level of welfare in each period henceforth.
The results point in the direction opposite to the common perception in the literature as children
are made better o⁄ with the implementation of a borrowing constraint, and the average welfare
levels of agents increases. In an unconstrained economy, if children are Cournot players and have
no strategic power over their parents, the outcome of the game played between them and their
altruistic parents maximizes parents￿utility. However, the resulting Cournot-Nash equilibrium
does not maximize the average level of utility of currently living agents, as was shown in Bernheim
(1989), nor the welfare of children. In fact, if given some strategic power, children would alter
their decisions to take advantage of the positive externality they have on their parents￿utility and
generate a higher level of parental transfers. They would increase savings, reducing consumption,
raising their marginal utility of consumption; parents would respond by increasing transfers to
children. Therefore, the level of parental transfers that maximizes average welfare is also higher
2than the level that is optimal for parents to give in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. By reducing
the amount of borrowing by children, a binding credit constraint e⁄ectively increases children￿ s
savings and places them at a point in their parents￿reaction function that results in a higher level
of parental transfers. By inducing an increase in parental transfers, the borrowing constraint moves
the economy closer to the optimum generating aggregate welfare gains. Children are made better
o⁄ because they receive more transfers and do not have any debt to repay in the future; they move
closer to the levels of parental transfers and savings that maximize their welfare. Parents are made
worse o⁄ because of the decrease in consumption and leisure implied by the increase in parental
transfers; however, the increase in their descendant￿ s life-time utility o⁄-sets this e⁄ect, fully or
partially.
In addition, the long-run increase in welfare is higher than the one observed in the short-run.
Upon the introduction of the borrowing constraint, children￿ s savings increases while their accu-
mulation of human capital decreases. The ￿rst e⁄ect dominates, making future parents wealthier.
Because wealthier parents are willing to transfer more resources to their children, future children
receive more parental transfers and are better o⁄ than current ones.
Hence, the widely held presumption that imposing a borrowing constraint leads to lower levels
of welfare, at least in the short-run, occurs because some important implications of the borrowing
constraint on the outcome of the game played between children and their altruistic parents have
been ignored.
This feature has been overlooked in the literature in part because the focus has been on study-
ing the impact of borrowing constraints in in￿nitely lived agents economies (Aiyagari, 1994) or
overlapping generations economies where agents are sel￿sh. Moreover, the emphasis has mostly
been on the general equilibrium e⁄ects resulting from the impact of borrowing constraints on the
accumulation of capital. Jappelli and Pagano (1994) show that by increasing the levels of physi-
cal capital borrowing constraints can enhance growth. De Gregorio (1996), Christous (2001), and
Buiter and Kletzer (1992) have looked at their impact in overlapping generations models where
agents also accumulate human capital. But in these papers agents are sel￿sh which precludes any
role for parental transfers. Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Seshadri (2002) study the importance of asset
markets on the accumulation of human capital in a world with parental altruism where children
3di⁄er by ability. However, they do not account for the impact on children￿ s welfare.1 Also in an
overlapping generations model with altruism, Altig and Davis (1989) have found that borrowing
constraints increase welfare in the long-run. However, they consider only long-run stationary equi-
libria and attribute the welfare gains to the pecuniary e⁄ects of borrowing constraints, namely to
the increase in wages generated by the rise in capital resulting from the forced increase in savings.
Laitner (1993) looks at the frequency of binding borrowing constraints over the life-cycle in the
long-run. He notices that borrowing constraints result in larger parental transfers which mitigate
the long-run negative welfare impact of binding borrowing constraints by reducing their frequency.
In a di⁄erent context, Schreft (1992) shows that credit controls can generate a Pareto superior
allocation in an environment where individuals make excessive use of credit as a substitute for
money in exchange.
In this paper I also account for the impact that borrowing constraints have on welfare through
their e⁄ect on the aggregate levels of physical and human capital. On the one hand, the inability to
borrow against future income hinders children￿ s investment in education, decreasing the aggregate
level of human capital. On the other hand, borrowing constraints can increase aggregate savings
and, hence, the aggregate level of physical capital. In the calibrated general equilibrium version
of the model, where these changes impact factor prices, the physical capital e⁄ect dominates, and
ampli￿es the welfare gains of introducing borrowing constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I build a simple model to analyze the impact
of an increase in savings on parental transfers and welfare, and present results that indicate that a
borrowing constraint might increase the average level of welfare. In section 3, I present an extended
and more realistic economic environment where children borrow against future income to ￿nance
consumption and education. Because it is not possible to provide analytical results, I solve the
model numerically to assess the impact of a borrowing constraint on welfare. In section 4, the
parameters of the economy are calibrated to match long-run features of the US economy. Section
5 presents and analyzes the alternative equilibria. Finally, section 6 concludes and suggests some
directions for future research.
1Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Seshadri (2002) prove that the introduction of a borrowing constraint decreases the
average level of welfare of currently living agents. But in their model children are not active agents which leads the
authors to account only for the welfare of adults when they compute their measure of average welfare.
42. Some preliminary analytical results
Before analyzing the impact of a borrowing constraint on welfare, it is useful to build a simple model
to focus on some features of the overlapping generations environment with parental altruism that
are crucial to the role of the borrowing constraint. I start by looking at how the interaction between
parents and children determines the levels of parental transfers in the unconstrained economy and
its welfare implications. I then establish an important link between children￿ s savings, parental
transfers, and welfare and show that a small constraint on children￿ s borrowing increases children￿ s
lifetime utility and the average level of welfare.
2.1. A simple model with altruism
To derive analytical results, I study a three period economy where two types of agents live in the
two ￿rst periods. I assume that an age-1 agent, the child, is born in each of the ￿rst two periods. An
agent lives for two periods, ￿rst as a child then as an adult. As an adult, at age-2; an agent becomes
a parent, except in the last period of the economy, and derives utility from her own consumption
and also from the child￿ s lifetime utility.2
A child born in period t (t = 1;2) maximizes her discounted lifetime utility given by
V1;t = U(c1;t) + ￿U(c2;t+1) + ￿ ￿p V1;t+1 (2.1)
where V1;t is the discounted lifetime utility of a child in period t, ￿ > 0 is the intertemporal discount
factor and ￿p > 0 is the altruism discount factor, the factor at which the parent discounts the child￿ s
lifetime utility. U(:) is the utility function which is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly
concave, twice continuously di⁄erentiable and to satisfy the Inada conditions. ci;t is consumption
of an age ￿ i individual in period t. The third period adult has no children, so V1;3 = 0:
The ￿rst period adult maximizes her discounted lifetime utility given by
V2;1 = U(c2;1) + ￿p V1;1 (2.2)
2I abstract from ￿two-sided￿altruism to simplify the analysis and focus on particular aspects of the interaction
between adult parents and their underage children. The largest part of intergenerational transfers, including expen-
ditures on health and education, are from parents to children, moreover, the bulk of the interaction between parents
and their o⁄spring occurs when parents are adults and their o⁄spring are children, when children￿ s altruism might
not be relevant. I later show that this assumption is not crucial.
5Individuals earn yi at age i as labor income and accumulate assets. The budget constraints
facing individuals at time t can be written as
c1;t = g2;t + y1 ￿ a2;t+1; for t = 1;2; (2.3)
c2;t = (1 + r)a2;t ￿ g2;t + y2; for t = 1;2;3; (2.4)
where g2 represents the resources given by a parent to her children, a2;t denotes the beginning-of-
period asset holdings of an age-2 agent at time t, and r denotes the exogenous rate of return on
these assets.
In terms of the strategic behavior of agents in the game played between the parent and the
child, I focus on the simplest strategic setting and look at the standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
I assume that children are Cournot players, that is, they take as given the decisions of their parents
when making their own decisions. Hence, I assume away equilibria where children have an active
role in the bargaining process. This is a common assumption in the literature and is also the
most realistic one when dealing with the relation between parents and underage children: children
have no bargaining power, while parents usually make most decisions for their children. O￿ Connel
and Zeldes (1993) show that, given children￿ s Cournot behavior, the strategic power of parents is
irrelevant. That is, if children take as given their parents￿actions, the resulting equilibrium is the
same whether parents are Stackelberg leaders, Cournot players that take their children￿ s decisions
as given, or make decisions for their children.
Therefore, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium maximizes the utility of parents. It is therefore not
surprising that, when measures of welfare are based on the utility of currently living parents or do
not account for the utility of currently living children, departures from the Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium reduce welfare (e.g., Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Seshadri, 2002).
O￿ Connel and Zeldes￿(1993) ￿nding also means that when children have no bargaining power we
can solve for the equilibrium assuming that all agents are Cournot players. Henceforth, I assume
that both parents and children are Cournot players and I consider a Cournot-Nash bargaining
model, as is standard in the literature.
The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to asset holdings, a2;t+1; and transfers, g2;t; are respec-
6tively:
Uc(c1;t) = ￿(1 + r)Uc(c2;t+1) for t = 1;2 (2.5)
Uc(c2;t) = ￿pUc(c1;t) for t = 1;2 (2.6)
The decision function that determines the level of parental transfers for any given level of
children￿ s decision (equation 2.6) and the budget constraints (equations 2.3 and 2.4) can then
be used to characterize the relation between the level of parental transfers, parent￿ s wealth and
children￿ s decisions.
For an utility function that is strictly increasing and strictly concave, we obtain the standard
feature of altruistically motivated transfers: any factor that 1) increases parents pre-transfer con-
sumption, or 2) decreases children￿ s pre-transfer consumption, results in an increase in parental
transfers. The marginal utility of transfers for parents is given by the di⁄erence between the
marginal utility of their own consumption and the marginal utility of their children￿ s consump-
tion. A decrease in children￿ s pre-transfer consumption increases the marginal utility of children￿ s
consumption and increases the parent￿ s marginal utility of transferring resources to her children.
Hence, everything else constant, parental transfers increase with parent￿ s wealth, a2;t, and children￿ s
savings, a2;t+1.
2.2. Welfare maximization
The levels of parental transfers, g2;t; and children￿ s savings, a2;t+1, that maximize average welfare
Wt = V1;t + V2;t; (2.7)
taking as given future decisions,3 are such that:
Uc(c1;t)(1 + ￿p) = Uc(c2;t) (2.8a)
Uc(c1;t) = ￿(1 + r)Uc(c2;t+1) (2.8b)
3This assumption is made for the sake of clarity. The purpose of the optimality conditions is to recollect the
rationale presented in Bernheim (1989).
7The di⁄erence between the optimality condition (2.8a) and the parents￿￿rst order conditions for
g2;t; equation ( (2.6)), is not trivial for any level of the altruism discount factor, ￿p. Hence, the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is not welfare maximizing, a result that was proved by Bernheim (1989,
Theorem 1). The optimality conditions (2.8a) and (2.8b) imply that the level of parental transfers
that maximizes current welfare is higher than the one chosen by parents in the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium. In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, parents are indi⁄erent between allocating one extra
unit of resources to their own consumption or to their children￿ s consumption. Children are always
better o⁄with a higher level of parental transfers. Therefore, a social planner that weights children￿ s
utility positively also prefers a larger level of parental transfers.
Moreover, if parental transfers are larger, according to the Euler equation, (2.8b), the level of
children￿ s savings is greater. So a social planner would also prefer a larger level of children￿ s savings.
2.3. Savings and welfare
It is now possible to establish a crucial relationship between the average levels of welfare and a
forced increase in savings, which can be interpreted as the result of a borrowing constraint.
From the previous section it is clear that a social planner that seeks to maximize current
average welfare would like to implement a higher level of parental transfers. However, in the
absence of constraints on gifts and asset accumulation, policies that transfer resources lump-sum
across generations are neutral in overlapping generations model with altruistic transfers (see Altig
and Davis, 1989). Hence, it is not possible to attain the optimal allocation of resources from parents
to children by imposing a lump-sum tax on parents and transferring the revenues to children. But,
because when parents make their transfers decisions, they respond to children￿ s savings, a change
on the assets accumulated by children impacts parental transfers and can drive them closer to their
socially optimal level.
Proposition 1: When the economy is in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a marginal increase in
children￿ s savings increases children￿ s lifetime utility and the average level of welfare.











8The ￿rst component of this equation describes the welfare impact of a change in children savings
through the distortion it introduces on current and future children￿ s savings decisions, while the
second one relates to its impact on the child￿ s utility through the response it generates in parental
transfers.
The welfare gains for the current children and parents of an increase on the savings of current










= ￿p [￿Uc(c1;1) + ￿(1 + r)Uc(c2;2)]: (2.11)














We can use the ￿rst-order condition for parental transfers (equation 2.6) and the budget constraints







Because ￿p is positive and U(:) is strictly concave, 0 < @g2;1=@a2;2 < 1; which implies that when
children￿ s savings, a2;2; go up, parental transfers, g2;1, also increase, but by less than children￿ s
savings.￿
Thus, there is a welfare gain from increasing children￿ s savings from their Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium levels and this gain is related to the increase in children￿ s savings and the response of parental
transfers to changes in children￿ s savings. This increase in savings can correspond to the impact of
a small constraint on children￿ s borrowing. Therefore, Proposition 1 shows that a small borrowing
9constraint increases children￿ s lifetime utility and the average level of welfare.4
Notice that when children￿ s savings are increased in the ￿rst period, children￿ s savings respond











i > 0 (2.15)
This relates to the ￿ndings in Laitner (1993) where a binding borrowing constraint results in an
increase in parental transfers and desired future savings and therefore reduces the likelihood of
future binding borrowing constraints.
The asset accumulation decision has two distinct roles in a model with parental altruism. Sav-
ings allow children to smooth consumption by reallocating resources across time, and it generates
an increase in parental transfers by raising the marginal utility of children￿ s consumption. So if
a child would have any strategic power, she would take advantage of the positive externality she
has on her parent￿ s utility by ￿working￿on her parent￿ s reaction function. She would choose a
higher level of asset accumulation than in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in order to decrease her
current consumption, increase her marginal utility of consumption and thus generate a higher level
of parental transfers. By construction, this increase in children￿ s savings would increase her lifetime
utility.
This bargaining perspective leads then to another interpretation of the impact of a forced
increase in savings on the outcome of the game played between parents and their children. We
can assume that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs because timing is such that children cannot
commit to decisions that would place them in a better place in their parents￿reaction function.
Children would like to have their parents believe that they would save more; however, this is not
credible. A forced increase in savings can then be viewed as a commitment technology that tells
parents that children are, in fact, going to save above the unconstrained time-consistent level.
Hence, provided that the transfer motive is active and the o⁄spring take as given the decision of
their parents, a forced increase in savings can have a positive impact on their well-being and on the
average level of welfare of currently living agents. The assumption of non-strategic behavior by the







@a2;2 and the results still hold.
10underage children is crucial. If they could behave strategically, it is possible that the competitive
equilibrium would result in levels of transfers at or above the optimum and an increase in savings
would decrease welfare.
These results also hold in a model with two-sided altruism. In the presence of two-sided altruism,
assuming that the child discounts the parent￿ s lifetime utility at the rate ￿c, and the child can
transfer a positive amount of resources, g1;t; to the parent, the individual optimality conditions for
transfers are:
g1;t : Uc(c1;t) ￿ ￿cUc(c2;t) (2.16a)
g2;t : Uc(c2;t) ￿ ￿pUc(c1;t): (2.16b)
While the level of transfers that maximize total welfare (2.7) are such that:
(1 + ￿p)Uc(c1;t) = (1 + ￿c)Uc(c2;t) (2.17a)
If g2;t is unconstrained, as is assumed, or if the constraint on g2;t is not binding we have:
Uc(c1;t) ￿ ￿cUc(c2;t); g1;t = 0; (2.18a)
Uc(c2;t) = ￿pUc(c1;t) (2.18b)
which implies
(1 + ￿p)Uc(c1;t) ￿ (1 + ￿c)Uc(c2;t): (2.19a)
This means that even in the presence of two-sided altruism, the level of parental transfers, g2;t,
that maximizes welfare is higher than the one chosen by parents in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Because the impact of savings on welfare depend on the sub-optimality of parental transfers, the
results also hold in the case of two-sided altruism.
If parental altruism is of the paternalistic form where rather than caring about the child￿ s overall
happiness parents care about allocations that depend positively on their children￿ s resources, e.g.
children￿ s consumption, investment on education or human capital accumulation, parental transfers
will still be sub-optimal and the results still hold.
11However, these results do not hold in a warm-glow model. When parents utility is a function of
the resources they give to their children, parental transfers are sub-optimal but they do not respond
to the change in children￿ s consumption that results from the increase in savings.
2.4. Savings and welfare in the Long-run
I showed above that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is not optimal and a forced increase in savings
increases the average level of welfare of currently living generations. At this point it is important to
examine the long-run implications of increasing children￿ s savings. In this section, I show that the
mechanism described in the previous section generates a higher increase in welfare in the long-run.
I then use these ￿ndings to rationalize the introduction of human capital accumulation in a model
used to evaluate the impact of a borrowing constraint.
Proposition 2: When the economy is in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a permanent marginal
increase in children￿ s savings increases children￿ s lifetime utility and the average level of welfare in
the ￿rst and in the second periods. Moreover, the increase in the average level of welfare is higher
in the second period than the in the ￿rst one.
Proof:
The welfare gains for children of a permanent marginal increase in savings (@a2) are the same







both in the long-run, t = 2, and in the short-run, t = 1.
We can then use the ￿rst-order condition for parental transfers (equation 2.6) to derive the
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In a three period economy, where agents only accumulate assets for two periods, a permanent
increase in savings is equivalent to an increase in savings over the two periods. The impact of the
increase in the ￿rst period variables can be viewed as its short-run e⁄ect, and its impact in the
second period variables as its long-run e⁄ect.
As current children￿ s savings increase, future parent￿ s wealth increases. Parent￿ s pre-transfer
consumption increases which decreases the marginal utility of parent￿ s consumption and increases
her marginal utility of transferring resources to her children. Consequently, wealthier parents
transfer more resources to their children. So, a permanent increase in children￿ s savings leads to a
higher increase in future parental transfers than in current ones. Therefore, because the response
of parental transfers is higher in the long-run, the impact on the lifetime utility of agents is also
higher in the long-run.
A forced increase in savings increases the average level of utility of agents in the short-run and
in the long-run with the long-run impact being stronger due to the resulting increase in parents￿
wealth.
This simple analysis allows us to understand a consequence of borrowing constraints that has
been overlooked in the literature. From Propositions 1 and 2 it is clear that a marginal increase
in children￿ s savings in the standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium increases average welfare both in
the short and in the long-run. Therefore a binding borrowing constraint, which results in a forced
increase in children￿ s savings, might also have a positive welfare e⁄ect. In an environment where
children borrow against future income, a credit constraint, by reducing the amount of borrowing by
children, e⁄ectively increases children￿ s savings. The resulting increase in children￿ s savings reduces
children￿ s consumption and raises their marginal utility of consumption. The optimal response of
parents is to increase transfers to children. So the forced increase in children￿ s savings results in an
increase in parental transfers and might move them closer to their socially optimal level.5 Hence,
a borrowing constraint can move the economy towards the social optimum by inducing an increase
in parental transfers and can therefore increase average welfare.
5Cox (1990) presents empirical evidence that parents transfer more resources to their children to alleviate liquidity
constraints.
13Altig and Davis (1989) have shown that, in a standard overlapping generations model with
altruism, borrowing constraints increase welfare in the long-run. However they attribute this e⁄ect
solely to the long-run general equilibrium e⁄ects of the borrowing constraint, namely on the increase
in the long-run wage levels due to the rise in capital resulting from the forced increase in savings.
Additionally, they presume there are short-run costs of transitioning to this better steady-state
which preclude any argument for allowing restrictions on loans.
I have shown that, independently of the pecuniary e⁄ects of the increase in savings underlined
in Altig and Davis (1989), a small borrowing constraint increases children￿ s lifetime utility and the
average level of welfare in the short and in the long-run.
Assume now that we have a closed in￿nite horizon version of the economy where savings are
channeled to the accumulation of physical capital, K. Production depends on capital according to
a standard neoclassical production function, f(K). The interest rate is given by
r = f0(K) ￿ ￿





si i = 1;2
where s1 + s2 = 1:
The steady-state of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the economy is such that:




If ￿p￿ < 1, capital is below the golden rule level of capital and we can say that the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium results in under accumulation of capital in the sense that it is possible to generate
higher levels of consumption and welfare in a steady-state with more capital. Once we allow for
pecuniary e⁄ects, the increase in labor income resulting from the rise in capital, due to the increase
in savings, generates extra welfare gains as shown in proposition 3 in Altig and Davis (1989). As a
consequence, the pecuniary e⁄ects emphasized in Altig and Davis (1989) can further improve the
long-run impact of a binding borrowing constraint on welfare by bringing the aggregate level of
14capital closer to its golden rule level. However, it can also decrease long-run welfare if it pushes the
aggregate level of capital above that level.
Thus, the question concerning the impact of a borrowing constraint is whether it places the
economy closer to the optimal path, enhancing average welfare, or further away beyond it, decreas-
ing average welfare. Since I cannot characterize analytically the steady-states and the transition
paths from an equilibrium where children borrow against future income, after the introduction of
a borrowing constraint, I study numerically the impact of borrowing constraints in key economic
variables and welfare.
In addition, it is usually presumed that borrowing constraints lead to underinvestment in human
capital. De Gregorio (1996) and Christous (2001) have shown that by reducing human capital
accumulation, borrowing constraints have negative e⁄ects on the level of human capital and on
growth. If I allow for the endogenous accumulation of human capital in the three period economy,
a forced increase in savings has a negative impact on human capital. If h2;t+1 = H(et); where et
is the amount of physical resources allocated by children to the accumulation of human capital in




at the Nash-Cournot equilibrium. But de1
da2;2 < 0; which implies that human capital decreases when
children￿ s savings rise.
Therefore, the presence of human capital accumulation might diminish or even reverse, the
long-run e⁄ects that were discussed earlier. On the one hand, future parents will be less wealthy
and might transfer fewer resources to their children. On the other hand, the decrease in human
capital reduces worker￿ s productivity o⁄setting the pecuniary e⁄ects of the increase in physical
capital.
Hence, in the next section, to look at the impact of a borrowing constraint on welfare, I construct
a more realistic economic environment that allows for the endogenous accumulation of human
capital and where prices are ￿ exible.
3. An extended economy with altruism
I study an economy where a large number of identical agents are born in each period and live
for T periods, ￿rst as children and then as adults. Individuals in each generation maximize their
15discounted lifetime utility. For someone born in period t this is given by
V1;t = U(c1;t;l1;t) + ￿V2;t+1 (3.1)




￿ i￿jU(ci;t+i￿j;li;t+i￿j) + ￿p f Vj￿1;t j = 2;:::;T (3.2)
where ￿ > 0 is the intertemporal discount factor, ci;t is consumption, and li;t is leisure of an
age￿i individual in period t. Agents are assumed to have f children in the second period of their
lives. A parent values her children￿ s consumption and leisure because she cares for their well-being.
￿p 2 [0;1=(￿ f)) is the discount factor for their o⁄spring￿ s lifetime utility. Furthermore, children
have the same preferences as adults over their own consumption and leisure.
The ￿momentary￿utility function is assumed to take the constant relative risk aversion form





where ￿ is the coe¢ cient of risk aversion, and ￿ is the coe¢ cient of consumption on the Cobb-
Douglas index.
The exogenous fertility rate of the population is f; so that a younger generation is f times
bigger than the preceding one. The share of age ￿ i individuals in the population, given by the
measure ￿i, i = 1;2;::;T; is constant over time, and ￿i+1 = 1
f￿i; with
PT
i=1 ￿i = 1.
Individuals have one unit of time each period to allocate to work, education, and leisure. In the
￿rst period of their lives, agents can choose how much time they allocate to leisure, education, and
work. Before their mandatory retirement they can work for (T ￿ 1) periods supplying hi;t hours
of labor and earning wt hi;tsi;t; where wt and si;t are the real hourly wage rate per unit of human
capital and age ￿ i agent￿ s level of human capital in period t, respectively. In the last period of
their lives they retire and consume or bequeath the value of their assets.
Agents in this economy accumulate claims on real capital used in production by ￿rms. The
16budget constraint facing an individual of age i at time t can be written as
ai+1;t+1 = (1 + rt)ai;t ￿ gi;t + gi+1;t=f + wt hi;tsi;t ￿ ci;t ￿ ei;t; (3.4)
where ai;t denotes the beginning-of-period asset holdings of an age ￿ i individual at time t, and
rt denotes the rate of return on these assets. The variable ei;t describes private investment in
education. Finally, gi;t represents the resources (in terms of the consumption good) given by a
parent to her children, so gi+1;t=f are the resources received by age￿i agent from her age￿(i+1)
parent. Without loss of generality, I allow these transfers from parents to occur twice during their
lifetime: in the second period of parents￿lives when their o⁄spring are children and in the last
period of parents￿lives.
I assume that agents are Cournot players in the interaction with their parents. This is, equivalent
to assuming that children take as given the resources they receive from their parents. They simply
receive whatever transfer is given, and they cannot manipulate their parent￿ s decision. A more
realistic assumption would be to allow adult parents to make decisions in behalf of their underage
children, but as noted in section (2), both assumptions result in a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. The
determinant factor is that children do not have any bargaining power.6
Transfers from age￿T parents to their o⁄spring, gT;t,cannot be negative, but I allow inter-vivo
transfers from age ￿ 2 parents to their children, g2;t,to be negative. That is, age ￿ 2 parents can
make children transfer resources to them.7 Henceforth, I will refer to these two types of transfers
distinctively as bequests and parental transfers respectively.
I study two economies. In the ￿rst one, the unconstrained economy, children can borrow against
future income. In the second one, the borrowing constrained economy, children cannot borrow
6The assumption that underage children do not act strategically in the interaction with their parents is crucial but
is also realistic. However, I allow adult children to overlap several periods with their parents, and strategic behavior
can then emerge between them. If children behave strategically, the equilibrium might result in levels of transfers
at or above the optimum and an increase in savings would then reduce welfare. Whether, given the nature of the
game played by underage children and their parents, the strategic behavior of adult children in the relation with their
parents would change the results signi￿cantly depends on whether the outcome of the early interactions is reversed
and the lifetime transfers from parents to their o⁄spring is no longer sub-optimal. This is a question that, to my
knowledge, has not been answered in the literature and will also not be addressed in this paper. In e⁄ect, I abstract
from strategic behavior to focus on the role of the channels associated with the relation between adult parents and
their underage children.
7This assumption means that age-2 parents can use their children￿ s resources, acquired through borrowing or child
labor, for instance, to ￿nance their own consumption. Note however that in the equilibria of the calibrated version
of the model we only observe positive inter-vivo transfers.
17against their future income:
a2;t ￿ 0; 8t: (3.5)
Children accumulate human capital by going to school. The level of human capital accumulated
by each child increases with the time allocated to learning, d1;t; and the quality of the education
service. The quality of the service provided is assumed to be an increasing function of the total
level of physical resources invested, e1;t.






where the parameters ￿d and ￿e are respectively the coe¢ cients of time and physical resources in
the learning technology while ￿ is the total factor productivity of the education process.




where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the labor share of output, and Yt; Kt, and Lt are the levels of output, capital
input, and e⁄ective labor input, respectively.
The capital stock is equal to the aggregate asset holdings of individuals in the economy. It
depreciates at a constant rate ￿ and evolves according to the law of motion,
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + It: (3.8)
The e⁄ective labor input is given by the number of hours worked by agents in the economy weighted




￿i;t si;t hi;t, (3.9)
where Nt is the size of the population in period t.
Competitive ￿rms maximize pro￿ts, equal to Yt ￿ ￿Kt ￿ wtLt ￿ rtKt, taking the wage, wt,
8This learning technology is similar to the one in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Soares (2005) for instance.
18and the interest rate, rt, as given. The ￿rst-order conditions for the ￿rm￿ s problem determine the
following functions for the net real return to capital and the real wage rate:
rt = (1 ￿ ￿)(Kt




3.1. Optimality and social welfare
I evaluate equilibria using utilitarian social welfare functions that, as noted by Samuelson (1968),
should be used to analyze the normative aspects of economic policy. Pareto optimality is not a
persuasive criterion as it is too lenient in evaluating equilibria, supporting a wide range of equilibria
where agents fare in very distinct ways, and is too strict in evaluating changes to the economic
environment. This is particularly true in overlapping generations economies, where it is rarely
possible to make any of the currently living agents better o⁄ without making at least another one
worse o⁄. As in Diamond (1965), Samuelson (1968), Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), Ghiglino and
Tvede (2000), and Erosa and Gervais (2000) among others, a utilitarian social welfare function can










where ￿p 2 [0;1=f) is the social discount factor, the rate at which the central planner discounts
the utility of future generations. The ￿social planner￿maximizes the weighted well-being of agents
living in the economy, currently and in the future, taking into account the well-being stemming
from altruism. But, due to altruism, the lifetime utility of future generations is counted multiple
times, and this social planner￿ s function not only is time-inconsistent, but it biases the evaluation
of policies towards the ones that generate higher gains in the long-run.9 Moreover, economic theory
provides no guidance for the choice of the weight, ￿pf, given to the welfare of future generations.
As such the choice of a social welfare function introduces a signi￿cant amount of subjectivity in
the analysis. To deal with this issue, I do not aggregate welfare across periods, so I do not have
to take a stand on the relative importance of future generations. I concentrate on evaluating how
9See Bernheim (1989) for a thorough discussion of this problem.
19changes to the economic environment a⁄ect the distribution of welfare across agents and on the






To solve the model numerically I assign values to the parameters of preferences and technologies.
I calibrate the steady-state of the closed economy where children cannot borrow against future
income. I assume that agents in this model live for 5 periods and the model period is 17 years long.
Agents are born at the age of 1 becoming adult workers at age 17, they then can work for 51 years
and retire thereafter to a total real-life age of 85 years.
Fertility Rate
The exogenous fertility rate is calibrated to match the observed population growth rate for the
US economy in the last decades, 0:012 (Citibase Data, 1946-1993). For the ￿ve generation model,
this translates to a growth rate of f = 1:2248.
Preferences
I set the coe¢ cient of risk aversion ￿ equal to the standard value, 2; and choose the values for the
discount factor, ￿, and the coe¢ cient of consumption in the utility function, ￿; so that steady-state
capital-output is approximately 3:32 and, on average, agents in the labor force allocate a third of
their time to labor (see Cooley and Prescott (1995)). I set the coe¢ cient of consumption in the
utility function, ￿; equal to 0:29 and I set ￿ to be 0:69.
Altruism
I calibrate the altruistic discount factor, ￿p; to 0:54 to match the average ratio of spending
on public primary and secondary education to aggregate expenditures on consumption in the US
economy, 0:053, as in Fernandez and Rogerson (1995).10
Production Technology
The share of labor in the production function is set to 0:6 following Cooley and Prescott (1995).
The annual depreciation rate is 6:4%, so that the steady-state annual investment/capital ratio is
10The value obtained for ￿p is very similar to the one obtained by Nishiyama (2000, 2002) which calibrated this
parameter to match the relative size of intergenerational transfers.
200:076.
Education Technology
The evidence is mixed on the magnitude of the impact of school quality on learning with a very
wide range of estimates for the elasticity of the increase in educational attainment with respect to
spending per pupil. Card and Krueger (1996) survey the literature and ￿nd that estimates of the
elasticity of earnings with respect to spending per pupil in 25 studies range from 0:01 to 0:29; with
the average of the estimates being 0:16. According to Betts (1996), studies that use a functional
form for the education production function similar to the one in this paper tends to generate higher
estimates for the elasticities. I therefore calibrate the coe¢ cient of expenditures on education in
the education production function to 0:2, as in Fernandez and Rogerson (1995).
The coe¢ cient corresponding to the time dedicated to education is chosen in order to match
the average percentage of available time dedicated to education. Juster and Sta⁄ord (1991) ￿nd
that school aged children allocate about 29:41% of their time to school work. Like total factor
productivity in the goods technology, total factor productivity in the education technology only
has a scale e⁄ect on most variables; it does not a⁄ect the time allocations or factor prices and
impacts on all other variables by a factor of ￿
1
1￿￿e . For computational reasons, I set its value to 10.
The parameter choices for the benchmark model are summarized in table 1.
5. Findings
I ￿rst shut down the general equilibrium e⁄ects of the borrowing constraint and look at a partial
equilibrium where I maintain constant factor prices. This allows me to analyze the impact of the
borrowing constraint on individuals￿decisions and on welfare while abstracting from its pecuniary
externalities. For this purpose, I set the wage and interest rate to their equilibrium levels in the
steady-state of the unconstrained economy. I then take into account the pecuniary e⁄ect of the
borrowing constraint on individuals￿welfare by looking at the general equilibrium where factor
prices are endogenous.
215.1. Steady-State
I present the steady-state results in Table 2. In the ￿rst column, I summarize the results for
the unconstrained economy. Although, they receive a signi￿cant amount of resources from their
parents, it is optimal for children to ￿nance consumption and expenditures on education by also
borrowing against their future income.
In the second column, I show the partial equilibrium results for the economy where children
cannot borrow against future income. This equilibrium can be viewed as the equilibrium path of a
single family or as the equilibrium in a small open economy that takes as given international factor
prices. In the third column, I present the general equilibrium results for the borrowing constrained
economy.
I measure the welfare bene￿t of an agent in the economy with borrowing constraints as the
￿xed percentage increase in the lifetime consumption of an individual of the same age and her
descendents in the steady-state of the economy without borrowing constraints needed to equate
the level of welfare of both individuals. I refer to this measure as the compensating variation.
The compensating variation is positive (negative) if there is a welfare gain (loss) relatively to the
steady-state without borrowing constraints.
In this example, although, given the level of parental transfers, children want to borrow to
consume and invest in education, agents are better o⁄ in the steady-state when children are not
allowed to borrow. Consumption would have to increase by about 3.5% for a newly born agent to
be as well o⁄ in the steady-state without the borrowing constraint as in the steady-state with the
borrowing constraint.
The imposed increase in children￿ s asset accumulation resulting from the introduction of the
borrowing constraint reduces the resources available to children for education and consumption,
wts1;th1;t +
g2;t
f ￿ a2;t+1. But the level of transfers they receive from parents is higher than in the
initial equilibrium.11
In partial equilibrium, the constraint generates a decrease in children￿ s consumption and invest-
ment in education as the increase in parental transfer is lower than the increase in children￿ s savings
11As noted by Altig and Davis (1989), in the presence of borrowing constraints, all parental transfers occur in the
period where children are constrained. In the unconstrained economy, the timing of transfers is irrelevant and, for
simpli￿cation, I assume they occur in the ￿rst period.
22and hence is not strong enough to compensate for the impossibility of borrowing. This contrasts
with the outcome from the simpler model in section 2 (see Proposition 2) and results in part from
the persistency of the impact of the borrowing constraint on the level of skills and, hence, on the
income level of parents. It also underlines the importance of accounting for the human capital
accumulation process.
Furthermore, as the level of skills decreases, the e⁄ective real wage rate, wtsi;t, decreases, and
agents substitute consumption for leisure in response to the decline in the relative cost of leisure
in terms of consumption. As labor supply and the skill level decreases, income also decreases
and, although agents do not have to repay any debt, they further reduce consumption. But, the
reduction in consumption is o⁄set by the increase in leisure, and the steady-state utility levels are
higher than in the unconstrained equilibrium.
In general equilibrium, the increase in aggregate savings resulting from the borrowing constraint
generates a rise in capital accompanied by an increase in wages, a decrease in interest rates, and a
surge in output. In the long-run, the rise in parental transfers is more than enough to compensate
for the impossibility of borrowing, and both consumption and investment in education increase.
Because there is a signi￿cant increase in wealth, leisure also increases for most generations, and
the rise in welfare is much higher than when factor prices remain constant. Consumption would
have to increase by about 8.5% for a newly born agent to be as well o⁄ in the steady-state without
the borrowing constraint as in the steady-state with the borrowing constraint. Notice, that the
level of human capital is lower than in the initial equilibrium as, although they invest more physical
resources in education, children reduce the amount of time they allocate to education to enjoy more
leisure.
From these experiments it is clear that both the response of parental transfers and the change in
factor prices discussed in Altig and Davis (1989) play an important role in generating a signi￿cant
welfare impact of the borrowing constraint. In general equilibrium, both channels feed o⁄ each
other, which makes it di¢ cult to distinguish their contributions to the observed welfare gains. In
order to have a better idea of the relative impact of those two channels, I shut-down the parental
transfer channel and compute the general equilibrium steady-state of the constrained economy
where I maintain parental transfers ￿xed at their level in the unconstrained economy. As can be
seen in the last column of Table 2, the increase in the wage rate is much more signi￿cant in this
23environment, but welfare increases much less than in the other equilibria. Consumption would
have to increase by only about 1.7% for a newly born agent to be as well o⁄ in the steady-state
without the borrowing constraint as in the steady-state with the borrowing constraint. Hence the
contribution of parental transfers to the observed welfare gains in terms of compensating variation
is somewhere between 3.5% and 6.8%. These numbers underline the important role of the parental
transfer channel in generating the welfare gains associated with the introduction of the borrowing
constraint.
Although there are long-run bene￿ts from imposing a borrowing constraint in the benchmark
economy, everything else constant children would like to borrow against future income to ￿nance
consumption and investment in human capital. When faced with a borrowing constraint, young
agents respond by investing less in education and they will have less human capital. Hence, there
might exist short-run costs, not accounted for in our simpler model, that can preclude any gains from
allowing for this constraint. To analyze the short-run welfare impact of the borrowing constraint,
I look at the transition from the steady-state in the unconstrained economy to the steady-state of
the constrained one.
5.2. Transition path
I ￿rst show the partial equilibrium transition where I maintain the factor prices constant. I then
look at the general equilibrium transition where factor prices are endogenous.
5.2.1. Partial equilibrium
The central role played by the ￿altruism￿mechanism described in section 2 is clear as the resources
transferred by parents to their o⁄spring increase very signi￿cantly when the borrowing constraint
becomes e⁄ective. This factor is crucial and has been overlooked in the literature. In Figure 7.1,
we observe that in the ￿rst period, when the borrowing constraint is introduced, the transfers from
parents increase signi￿cantly (panel d); parents of current children (age-2 agents) increase inter-
vivo transfers, while older parents increase the amounts they will bequeath to their o⁄spring in the
last period of their lives. In the graph we see bequests increasing and peaking for the progenitors
of current age-2 parents. Older parents increase bequests which period after period trickle down to
current age-2 agents. This increase in bequests takes place in order to diminish the burden on the
24younger generations of parents who can use those future bequests to ￿nance current consumption
and parental transfers.
As a consequence of individuals￿ s responses to the introduction of the borrowing constraint,
there is an initial surge in aggregate savings resulting mostly from the reduction in debt, while
the aggregate level of human capital decreases signi￿cantly in the period following the onset of the
borrowing constraint as can be seen in Figure 7.3.
Most of the additional parental transfers are allocated by children to consumption which de-
creases by about 4% (panel a), while the resources allocated to education immediately decrease
signi￿cantly more, by almost 16%, (panels e and f), and then increase slightly to their new steady-
state values, remaining drastically below their initial levels. But as we can see in Figure 7.2 panel a,
children￿ s lifetime utility increases from the onset of the borrowing constrained equilibrium. This
increase in welfare is related to the surge in leisure (Figure 7.1 panel b) as the initial period￿ s
children not only allocate much less time to education but they also work less when older. These
￿ndings support the claim from Section 2 that the borrowing constraint can make children better
o⁄ by placing them in a better location in the reaction function of their parents.
Notice also that in the period where the borrowing constraint takes e⁄ect, the welfare of age-2
parents increases (see Figure 7.2 panel a). Facing a higher level of asset accumulation from their
children, parents ￿nd it optimal to increase the resources they transfer to them. In order to do so
they increase the time allocated to work (see Figure 7.1 panel c) and reduce current and future
consumption (see Figure 7.1 panel a). Hence, although their own older parents also increase the
amount they will bequeath them, for the initial period parents, the increase in parental transfers
comes at the cost of lower consumption and leisure levels for the remaining of their lives. This
implies that, in this economy, the ￿sel￿sh￿utility of the initial parents, that is utility levels derived
only from own consumption and leisure, decreases (see Figure 7.2 panel b). However, the signi￿cant
rise in children￿ s lifetime utility12 increases parents￿lifetime utility￿ s altruistic component more that
o⁄setting the previous e⁄ect and in the initial period￿ s age-2 parents￿lifetime utility increases. In
this calibration, only the lifetime utility of the oldest generation decreases in the short-run. More
importantly, in Figure 7.2, it is clear that the average lifetime utility of agents increases immediately
12Note that the increase in children￿ s welfare is a result of the increase in their "sel￿sh" lifetime utility and in the
altruistic component of their lifetime utility which depends on future children￿ s utility.
25in response to the borrowing constraint.13.
For the reasons presented in section 3.1, I chose to look at the average level of utility of the
agents living in each period. Nevertheless, because both average welfare and the lifetime utility
of children are higher in every period after the introduction of the borrowing constraint, we can
infer that any measure of welfare of the type described by (3.11) is also higher than in the un-
constrained equilibrium. Hence the borrowing constraint generates an increase in welfare for any










For the current calibration, these utility gains come at the cost of the ￿rst period age-5 agents.
In addition, we observe, in ￿gure 7.2 panel b, that children￿ s as well as the average levels of
￿sel￿sh￿ lifetime utility increase following the introduction of the borrowing constraint. Hence,
if we construct a welfare measure that ignores the altruistic components of agents￿utilities we
also obtain a welfare improvement with the introduction of the constraint on children￿ s ability to
borrow.
5.2.2. General equilibrium
The di⁄erence between the general equilibrium and the partial equilibrium paths stems from the
adjustment of factor prices and its feedback into agents￿decisions. As can be seen in Figure 7.4,
in general equilibrium, the initial increase in savings observed in the partial equilibrium path (see
￿gure 7.3) is spread out over time and sustained leading to a higher level of physical capital in the
long-run. As physical capital increases, the wage rate rises, and the interest rate decreases. The
response of the wage rate implies a rise in the return to education and in parents￿labor income
generating funds that are channeled to education. There is a rise in investment in education
relatively to the partial equilibrium path. As a result, initially, human capital drops much less than
in partial equilibrium and converges to considerably higher levels afterward although still below its
13In other calibrations of the model economy the results are qualitatively similar, but in some cases parent￿ s lifetime
utility decreases slightly. Nonetheless, children￿ s and the average lifetime utilities increase in all periods in all cases
studied.
26initial level.14
As income increases, consumption also rises and the levels of welfare are higher than in partial
equilibrium. Not only is the immediate increase in the average level of welfare higher in general
equilibrium (see ￿gures 7.6 panel a and 7.2 panel a), but children are much better o⁄ with the
introduction of the borrowing constraint while older generations are slightly worse o⁄ in the initial
periods because of the initial decrease in wages and subsequent decrease in interest rates. After-
wards, welfare increases steadily to a higher long-run level. By looking at Figures 7.2 panel b and
7.6 panel b we can see that most of the di⁄erence in the short-run levels of welfare is due to the
increase in the ￿sel￿sh￿lifetime utility of children.
Therefore the pecuniary e⁄ects of the increase in savings underlined in Altig and Davis (1989)
are important as they augment the positive impact of the borrowing constraint on welfare in the
long-run by bringing the aggregate level of capital closer to its golden rule level. However, they
are not essential as, even in the absence of any general equilibrium e⁄ects, a borrowing constraint
increases average welfare in the short and in the long-run.
6. Final comments
This paper looks at the impact of a constraint on children￿ s borrowing on welfare. The presumption
that such constraints are an obstacle to e¢ cient levels of education serves to rationalize political
designs that attempt to replicate the unconstrained equilibrium. But, in an overlapping generations
economy with altruism, the unconstrained Nash-Cournot equilibrium leads to sub-optimal levels of
parental transfers and does not maximize the welfare of children nor the average welfare of currently
living agents. I show that by forcing an increase in children￿ s savings that induces an increase in
parental transfers, a borrowing constraint can lead to an increase in children￿ s welfare as well as in
the average levels of welfare both in the short-run and in the long-run. In a calibrated model where
children invest in human capital, the welfare impact of a borrowing constraint can be quite large.
So, agents can be better o⁄in an economy with incomplete credit markets, and setting public policy
instruments in order to replicate the complete markets equilibrium might not be welfare improving.
14For other calibrations of the model, in general equilibrium the level of human capital rebounds to levels above
the initial ones. While the amount of physical resources allocated to education increases to levels above the initial
one in all the other examples, the levels of human capital also depend on the amount of time allocated to education
which decreases in this calibration.
27Although we might not want to replicate the allocation of resources obtained in the uncon-
strained equilibrium, the credit constrained equilibrium is at most a second best. However, it is
well known that if parents are altruistic and we have interior solutions for savings and private
transfers, policies that transfer resources across generations are neutral, as any public transfers are
exactly o⁄set by a change in private parental transfers. But, Altig and Davis (1989) show that, even
in the presence of altruism and an active transfer motive, policies that transfer resources across
generations can have a real e⁄ect in a borrowing constrained economy. So, the presence of a credit
constraint can also have a positive welfare impact by enlarging the set of functional policies as in-
tergenerational transfer policies become e⁄ective in the constrained economy and increase welfare.
Hence, even when its direct impact on welfare is negligible a borrowing constraint can help improve
the welfare of agents in the economy by allowing for a wider set of policy instruments.
In this paper, I do not look at the impact of restrictions on the ability of parents to borrow
against future income. Because in practice, parents are also widely a⁄ected by credit constraints,
the impact of constraints on parents￿ability to borrow is an issue that is worth considering in
environments where agents are altruistically linked to older parents. As I noted, depending on the
type of interaction between middle-aged agents and their parents, it is possible that a borrowing
constraint that a⁄ects adult￿ s decisions has a similar e⁄ect to the one underlined in the paper,
increasing inter-vivo transfers from older to middle-aged agents. Thus, if we are in a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, a borrowing constraint that restricts parents￿borrowing can also be welfare improving.
Finally, credit constraints seem to be closely related to child labor, and this paper shows that a
credit constraint that does not allow children to borrow might actually bene￿t children. It would
therefore be important to analyze how child labor responds to this type of borrowing constraint
and what does it imply for children￿ s well-being in an environment where they allocate time to
labor as well as the acquisition of human capital. Additionally, it would also be interesting to see
how the imposition of a ban on child labor a⁄ects welfare as it might trigger a response similar to
the one at the core of the results in this paper. In fact, a binding ban on child labor e⁄ectively
eliminates a source of income, reducing children￿ s consumption levels and increasing their marginal
utility of consumption. Parents respond by increasing their transfers to children. A ban on child
labor can therefore make children better o⁄ by generating an increase in parental transfers.
Hence, this paper presents an important albeit simple channel through which the economic
28environment a⁄ects the well-being of children; a channel that can be useful in analyzing policies
aimed at improving children￿ s welfare.
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317. Tables and ￿gures
Table 1 - Calibration
T f ￿ ￿ ￿p ￿ ￿ ￿e ￿d ￿ ￿
5 1:2248 :69 2 :54 :29 10 0:2 0:5 0:6 0:675
Table 2 - Steady-State Equilibria
Unconstrained Borrowing Constrained Economy
Economy Partial Eq. General Eq. General Eq. Fixed Trsfers
Skills 2.6569 2.4691 2.5934 2.1195
Labor
Age-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Age-2 0.5062 0.4810 0.4696 0.4376
Age-3 0.3280 0.2938 0.3238 0.3098
Age-4 0.0855 0.0390 0.1380 0.1530
Age-5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Assets
Age-2 -0.0228 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Age-3 0.0243 0.0359 0.0287 0.0317
Age-4 0.0913 0.0988 0.0928 0.0820
Age-5 0.1043 0.1047 0.1057 0.0908
Consumption
Age-1 0.0511 0.0502 0.0605 0.0387
Age-2 0.0985 0.0962 0.1141 0.1049
Age-3 0.1341 0.1309 0.1455 0.1288
Age-4 0.1824 0.1781 0.1855 0.1580
Age-5 0.2800 0.2810 0.2491 0.1981
Leisure
Age-1 0.6825 0.7094 0.7049 0.7447
Age-2 0.4938 0.5190 0.5304 0.5624
Age-3 0.6720 0.7062 0.6762 0.6902
Age-4 0.9145 0.9610 0.8620 0.8470
Age-5 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Parental Transfers (received) 0.0517 0.0704 0.0853 0.0517
Education Time 0.3175 0.2906 0.2951 0.2553
Private Funding of Education 0.0233 0.0202 0.0248 0.0130
Interest  rate 1.6838 1.6838 1.3554 1.1827
Wage rate 0.1838 0.1838 0.2031 0.2155
Income (GNP) 0.1408 0.1400 0.1479 0.1213
Welfare  Level of Age-1 Agent -13.5540 -13.2249 -12.7946 -13.3893
Compensating Variation 3.5224% 8.4596% 1.7364%
32Figure 7.1: Individual variables along partial equilibrium path.
33Figure 7.2: Welfare Levels along Partial Equilibrium Path.
34Figure 7.3: Aggregate variables along partial equilibrium path.
35Figure 7.4: Aggregate variables along general equilibrium path.
36Figure 7.5: Individual variables along general equilibrium path.
37Figure 7.6: Welfare Levels along General Equilibrium Path.
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